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ABSTRACT 
 
We hypothesize that insiders strategically choose disclosure policies and the timing of their equity 
trades to maximize trading profits, subject to the litigation costs associated with disclosure and insider 
trading.  Accounting for endogeneity between disclosures and trading, we find that when managers plan 
to purchase shares, they increase the number of bad news forecasts to reduce the purchase price.  In 
addition, this relation is stronger for trades initiated by chief executive officers than those initiated by 
other executives.  Confirming this strategic behavior, we find that managers successfully time their 
trades around bad news forecasts, buying fewer shares beforehand and more afterwards.  We do not 
find that managers adjust their forecasting activity when they are selling shares, consistent with higher 
litigation concerns associated with insider sales.  Overall, our evidence suggests that insiders do exploit 
voluntary disclosure opportunities for personal gain, but only selectively, when litigation risk is 
sufficiently low.   
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the association between managements’ trading activity and companies’ 
propensity to provide voluntary disclosures in the form of management forecasts.  Prior research 
provides evidence that insiders time their trades strategically around voluntary disclosures to 
maximize their wealth (e.g., Noe [1999]).  Instead of treating voluntary disclosures as 
exogenous, we consider management forecasts as a strategic choice variable that allows 
managers to profitably trade in their companies’ stocks.  Specifically, we investigate whether 
managers change the frequency of management forecasts in response to insider trading 
considerations.   
Existing research provides a number of reasons why managers voluntarily disclose 
information.  For examples, managers provide disclosures to reduce information asymmetry and 
the cost of capital (Coller and Yohn [1997], Verrecchia [2001], and Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo 
[2004]), to signal their ability (Trueman [1986]), or to reduce litigation costs (Skinner [1994]).  
In these cases, managers’ and investors’ disclosure preferences are aligned.  However, in other 
cases, their preferences are not aligned; managers are reluctant to disclose information if doing 
so reduces their consumption of perks or their control over the firm (Lo [2003], Nagar, Nanda, 
and Wysocki [2003]). 
When managers’ and investors’ disclosure preferences are not aligned, managers need to be 
motivated to disclose information to investors.  As argued in Dye [2001, p.184], “any entity 
contemplating making a disclosure will disclose information that is favorable to the entity, and 
will not disclose information unfavorable to the entity.”  That is, managers will make disclosures 
only when such disclosures provide them with (net) private benefits.  However, there is little 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=510842
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evidence of a direct link between managers’ private benefits and voluntary disclosure of 
corporate information.  This is the question we examine in this paper.  
Specifically, we investigate whether insider trading is an important incentive for providing 
timely disclosures.  Noe [1999] finds that managers (1) sell more shares after  good news 
releases than after bad news forecasts and (2) conversely buy more after bad news than after 
good news releases (where good or bad news is defined by the sign of abnormal returns around 
the forecast). That is, managers choose the timing of their trades to increase the gain from such 
trading given that they are going to trade and are going to disclose information.  We ask the 
question that naturally follows from these findings: If managers want to trade, will they disclose 
strategically to increase profits?  If managers want to sell shares in the future, do they increase 
the amount of good news net of bad news so that they can subsequently sell at higher prices?  
Likewise, if they are going to buy shares of their firms, do they disclose bad news and withhold 
good news so that they can then buy at lower prices? 
Insider trading opportunities are of course limited by the fact that such trades are governed by 
regulations and companies’ own policies.  Enforcement by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission as well as civil litigation impose costs on insider trading when such trading is 
perceived to be opportunistic.  Sufficiently high litigation cost will deter managers from timing 
their trades around management forecasts to the extent that it becomes empirically undetectable 
and then there would be no insider trading incentive for strategically disclosing good or bad 
news.    
We follow Noe [1999] and focus on management forecasts instead of other forms of 
disclosure.  The discretionary nature of these forecasts, as well as their frequent usage in recent 
years relative to other forms of disclosures make them more suitable than other disclosures.  In 
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addition, the issue of timing is crucial to our analysis, since we hypothesize that gains from 
short-term stock price movements motivate managers to make timely disclosures (i.e., to disclose 
information that would otherwise be revealed later by other means).  As Hutton, Miller, and 
Skinner [2003, p.869] note, “[for] all voluntary earnings disclosures, the question is really one of 
the timing of stock price effects because earnings realizations must follow the forecasts at some 
point.  Therefore, this argument [that managers benefit from higher stock prices] is really one 
about why managers benefit from obtaining the higher stock price now rather than later.”  In 
contrast, other types of disclosure such as conference calls are not necessarily followed by 
confirmatory reports at a later time.  For these reasons, management forecasts are an ideal type of 
disclosure to consider in this paper. 
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that insider trading incentives contribute to managers’ 
propensity to forecast in ways that increase trading profits.  Specifically, in periods when insiders 
buy more shares, there are more bad news forecasts, which help to lower the purchase price.  We 
use two different ways to control for the potential endogeneity of trading and disclosure activity, 
and find that this result is not solely driven by the reverse causal relation whereby disclosure 
influences trading. 
First, we use an instrumental variable approach and estimate the expected amount of insider 
trading in a particular quarter based on the information from the previous quarter.  Since the 
predicted amount of trading is not dependent on the subsequently realized disclosures, we isolate 
the effect of trading on disclosure.  As expected, we find that the predicted insider purchases are 
positively correlated with the frequency of bad news.  Second, we analyze the trading activity of 
chief executive officers (CEOs) separately from other insiders.  We hypothesize that the CEO 
has the most influence over whether a forecast is provided.  Consistent with this reasoning, we 
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find that, relative to the trading of other executives, the trading by CEOs has a stronger 
association with the frequency of management forecasts.   
In contrast to insider purchases, we do not find consistent evidence that insider sales motivate 
changes in disclosure. We attribute the lack of influence to the higher litigation costs associated 
with insider sale strategies.  That is, to increase profits from insider sales, managers need to 
accelerate good news or withhold bad news prior to selling shares, both of which entail 
substantial litigation risk. 
Our tests are designed to detect whether trading motives affect voluntary disclosure, and in 
doing so we control for the effect of disclosure on trading.  However, this is not to say that 
disclosure does not affect trading.  In fact, prior research has shown that disclosures do indeed 
affect insider trading.  Therefore, our evidence combined with prior results suggests that insider 
trading and voluntary disclosure decisions influence each other, and they are jointly determined 
by corporate management. 
The following section discusses our hypotheses and places them in the context of prior studies.  
Section 3 describes the management forecast and insider trading data.  We replicate the analysis 
of Noe [1999] in the Appendix and provide a brief discussion in Section 4.  In Section 5, we test 
our hypotheses and Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Prior Research and Hypothesis Development 
When there is a separation of ownership and control, equity incentives help to align the 
interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling [1976]).  An important way to 
increase ownership is stock-based compensation, i.e., option or stock grants.  Some firms, 
especially those with poor prior performance and low managerial ownership, adopt “target stock 
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ownership” plans to increase managers’ equity exposure (Core and Larcker [2002]).  A direct 
and unavoidable consequence of such equity incentives is that managers bear idiosyncratic risk 
of the companies that employ them.  Consequently, risk aversion leads managers to diversify 
through trading. Consistent with this argument, Ofek and Yermack [2000] find that when 
managers are awarded stock-based compensation, they tend to sell shares they already own.  In 
addition, Muelbroek [2000] finds that the incentive to diversify is especially strong for managers 
of Internet firms, which have high idiosyncratic risk.  That is, each manager tries to achieve a 
target level of equity holding that reflects his/her risk tolerance and the extent of agency 
problems.   
When managers trade shares in their own companies, they have an opportunity to exploit their 
private information to maximize trading profits.  To understand managers’ strategies, it is useful 
to delineate their optimization decision into two parts: (1) managers choose whether to disclose 
information (“the disclosure decision”); (2) given the disclosure choice, they can time insider 
trades to increase trading profits (“the timing decision”).  We begin by discussing the latter 
decision first. 
The timing decision involves when to execute trades relative to the disclosure date.  To 
increase profits, managers can purchase before good news or after bad news when prices are 
lower.  Similarly, managers can sell before bad news or after good news when prices are higher.  
Consistent with this logic, Noe [1999] finds that managers sell more shares after disclosing good 
news than after bad news and buy more after disclosing bad news than after good news.  
However, Noe does not find a significant difference in insider trading before forecasts are 
released, a result he attributes to higher litigation risk associated with trading before corporate 
announcements. 
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The Appendix formally outlines our hypothesis and tests of the timing decision along the lines 
of Noe [1999].  We replicate Noe’s analysis for several reasons.  First, confirmatory evidence is 
a necessary condition for our hypotheses regarding the disclosure decision: managers must 
strategically time their trades in order for insider trading to be a reason for strategic disclosures.  
Second, recent economic conditions differ substantially from those in the 1979-87 period studied 
by Noe.  In particular, stock-based compensation has increased dramatically over the 1990s 
(Murphy [1999]).  Management forecasting has also increased substantially from 949 forecasts 
in the nine years of Noe’s study, to over 1,500 per quarter in 2002, partly due to the safe harbor 
provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which reduced the risk of 
disclosing forward-looking information (Johnson, Kasznik, and Nelson [2001]).   
The next decision (although chronologically first) is whether to provide voluntary disclosures.  
Expectations of profitable insider trading around disclosures naturally create an incentive to 
make those disclosures.  Managers who want to sell shares can increase their gains by disclosing 
good news prior to executing their sales or withholding bad news.  Managers who plan to buy 
shares want to disclose bad news before their purchases or defer good news.  The hypothesis, 
stated in alternative form, is thus: 
H1: The frequency of voluntary disclosures changes in ways that allow management to 
increase trading profits. 
(a) The number of good (bad) news forecasts decreases (increases) with insider 
purchases. 
(b) The number of good (bad) news forecasts increases (decreases) with insider sales. 
 
These four predicted associations are summarized in the following diagram for ease of reference 
in subsequent discussions and analyses. 
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 Good news frequency Bad news frequency 
Purchases – (withhold good news)
+ 
(release bad news) 
Sales + (release good news) 
– 
(withhold bad news) 
 
This hypothesis is stated without explicitly considering litigation concerns, which we discuss 
below in our third hypothesis.  The hypothesized pattern of disclosures and trading can also be 
offset by managers’ incentives to send a costly signal of their companies’ fortunes.  For example, 
to reinforce a good news forecast, managers could purchase more of their companies’ stock.  
Likewise, if they truly believe that prospects are poor, managers are likely to sell in conjunction 
with delivering bad news.1 
Our analysis focuses on equity purchases and sales, in contrast to the analysis of Nagar, 
Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], who use the level of equity holdings.  Nagar et al. hypothesize and 
find that firms’ disclosures are positively related to insider ownership, the idea being that equity 
ownership provides management with incentives to disclose information to investors.  To 
complete this story, one needs to consider how management benefits from the disclosure of 
information, particularly the information that will in any case be provided in mandatory reports 
later (Barth [2003]).  We hypothesize that more disclosure events provide additional 
opportunities for management with equity holdings to gain from their trading.  Another feature 
that distinguishes our analysis from Nagar et al.’s is that, in addition to disclosure frequency, we 
also consider the sign of the news disclosed, which we expect to depend on the direction of 
trading. 
                                                 
1 Managers might also buy shares after bad news to signal that the company’s performance is not as bad as the 
markets think.  This is a special case of the reverse causality that managers trade in response to disclosure, which we 
address in Section 5.2. 
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The second hypothesis predicts that the relationship between trading and disclosures should be 
stronger for the CEO than for other members of the management team.  The intuition is based on 
the observation that the CEO of a firm has the most influence over a wide range of decisions, 
including financial disclosures.  Disclosure decisions are often made by the CEO, or jointly by 
the CEO and a committee of other executives (e.g., see the disclosure policies of Royal 
Dutch/Shell and General Electric).  If insider trading motivates disclosure, then the CEO’s 
trading should have the closest relationship with disclosure decisions.  Thus, we hypothesize as 
follows: 
H2: The association between voluntary disclosure frequency and the amount of insider 
trading is stronger for CEOs than for other executives.  
 
Testing this hypothesis also helps us to distinguish the direction of causality.  As explained in 
more detail in Section 5.4, evidence in support of H2 would be consistent with insider trading 
being a causal factor for disclosure, and inconsistent with trading as being simply a response to 
disclosure. 
We caution that strategic disclosure does not necessarily imply fraudulent misrepresentation.  
While managers cannot disclose good news or bad news at will, they do have flexibility in 
disclosures and a multi-dimensional disclosure space in terms of horizon, content, and timing.  
For examples, they can choose forecasts of next quarter’s results or next year’s; they can choose 
forecast of earnings or cash flows; or they can accelerate or delay the forecasts.  Therefore, they 
have considerable latitude in picking a variable that they expect to be viewed as good news or 
bad news, and equally important, they can choose not to disclose at all.  Furthermore, as 
discussed above, managers need to be motivated to disclose their private information. When in 
possession of private information, a manager with incentives from insider trading is more likley 
to disclose the information than a manager without such incentives, ceteris paribus. 
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While this disclosure and trading pattern can be viewed as “opportunistic,” it is also consistent 
with efficient contracting.  Allowing managers to engage in insider trading around management 
forecasts can be beneficial to shareholders taken as a whole.  Penman [1982, p.480] notes, “By 
permitting those with information to take market positions in conjunction with an announcement 
of that information, insider trading promotes the production and dissemination of information 
about firms and their projects.  Because of the public goods nature of information, this 
information may not otherwise be produced, and thus there may be an underinvestment in 
information in the economy.”  Of course, this public goods argument is of little solace to specific 
investors who suffer losses to insiders when they are on the other side of such transactions. 
Investor losses, if substantial enough, could lead to lawsuits.  Risk of civil litigation, in 
conjunction with possible criminal penalties arising from enforcement actions of the Securities 
and Exchange Commissions, should act as a constraint to management’s propensity to disclose 
and trade for personal benefit at the expense of shareholders.2  In the context of this study, there 
are two distinct sources of litigation risk: trading risk and disclosure risk.   
Trading risk is the cost of litigation arising from insider trades that are alleged to have 
occurred in contravention of the “disclose or abstain” doctrine, which derives from the case of 
Cady, Roberts and Co.(40 SEC 907 [1961]).  This rule requires that anyone in possession of 
material nonpublic information should either disclose it to the investing public before trading or 
abstain from trading.  Insider sales can attract litigation should there subsequently be a 
significant price decrease, as investors who suffer losses can allege that insiders traded on 
material non-public information that led to the price decline, violating the disclose or abstain 
rule.  In contrast, insider purchases unaccompanied by disclosure are unlikely to result in 
                                                 
2 Another constraint to management opportunism is firms’ own policies restricting insider trading, as documented 
in Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon [2000].  Corporate policies, when in place, generally prohibit managers from trading 
before major corporate events, limiting management’s ability to coordinate disclosures with insider trading.   
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litigation: subsequent price increases only result in opportunity losses for investors while price 
decreases are inconsistent with allegations of management opportunism 3 
Disclosure risk is the cost of litigation arising from management forecasts that prove to be 
inaccurate ex post.  This risk is also asymmetric.  Investors who lose money after a decrease in 
share value can sue management for issuing an optimistic forecast or failing to issue an earnings 
warning.  On the other hand, those who are dissuaded by a pessimistic forecast from buying into 
an asset that subsequently appreciates bear opportunity costs, which are not considered 
damages.4  Accordingly, disclosing good news and withholding bad news are riskier than 
withholding good news or disclosing bad news. 
Taking into account these two sources of litigation risk, the combined risk of the four 
predicted effects of trading on disclosure are characterized by the following diagram (cells 
indicate the level of trading risk, disclosure risk, and combined risk, respectively): 
 Good news frequency Bad news frequency 
Purchases withhold good news  (high / low / moderate) 
release bad news 
(low / low / low) 
Sales release good news (low / high / moderate) 
withhold bad news 
(high / high / high) 
 
In summary, insider strategies involving stock sales (lower row) or strategically choosing the 
release of good news (left column), are subject to higher litigation risk, which will tend to offset 
insiders’ profit motives.  Thus, we hypothesize as follows: 
 H3: The association between voluntary disclosure frequency and the amount of insider 
trading is weaker for combinations of disclosure and trading strategies involving 
insider sales and the disclosure (or withholding) of good news.  
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, insider purchases followed by good news releases can lead to investigation by the SEC, as this 
sequence of actions potentially contravene the disclose or abstain rule.  See for example, United States v. O’Hagan 
(117 S. Ct. 2199 [1997]) relating to trading on the foreknowledge of a potential tender offer for the Pillsbury 
Company.  
4 Opportunity losses are not damages as there is potentially an unlimited number of people who failed to buy. 
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3. Data 
We first describe our management forecast data, followed by insider trades.  Additional 
descriptions of the data for our analyses in Section 5 are provided along with those analyses. 
3.1 MANAGEMENT FORECASTS 
We obtain management forecast data from First Call’s Company Issued Guidelines database.  
First Call has comprehensive coverage of management forecasts since 1995, so our sample 
period starts with 1995 and ends with 2002.  Since our interest is the relation between insider 
trading and voluntary disclosure, with management forecasts as a measure of voluntary 
disclosure, we include all management forecasts, whether they are for earnings or other measures 
such as cash flow or revenue (although more than 99% of the forecast days do contain an 
earnings forecast), and whether the forecasts are for quarterly or annual periods.  All of these 
forecasts have a potential impact on stock prices and the profits from insider trading.  
Sometimes, a firm issues multiple forecasts on the same day—these forecasts are generally in 
conjunction with one another, such as one for next quarter and one for next year, or one for 
earnings and one for revenue.  In this paper, we treat multiple forecasts by the same firm on the 
same day as one forecast because we cannot separate the effects of coincident forecasts.  
To test our hypotheses, we need to distinguish between good news forecasts and bad news 
forecasts.  Since the focus is on how management forecasts affect stock prices (so that managers 
can gain more from insider trading), the natural proxy for the news is stock returns around 
management forecasts.  Thus, like prior research (e.g., Noe [1999]), we classify management 
forecasts based on the abnormal return around management forecasts.  The abnormal return is 
calculated as the sum of size-adjusted daily returns in the three-day window [–1, 1] around 
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management forecasts.  If the abnormal return is positive (negative), we classify the forecast as 
good news (bad news).5 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 27,792 management forecasts issued 
by the 4,995 firms which have both insider trading and management forecast data for the period 
1995–2002.6  Panel A reports information on the timing and abnormal returns for these 
management forecasts.  Timing refers to the number of days between a management forecast and 
the next quarterly earnings announcement date; it is zero for management forecasts occurring on 
the same day as earnings announcements.  As reported in the table, most management forecasts 
are disclosed within the month before earnings announcements.  The mean is 23 days and the 
median is 15 days.  However, note that these figures do not represent the forecast horizon, which 
are much longer as shown in the table (with a mean of 127 days and a median of 68 days), since 
the forecasted amounts need not be for the most immediate fiscal period.  Although many 
forecasts occur on the same day as earnings announcements, resulting in zero days between the 
two events reported in the table, the forecasts relate to future periods, not the earnings that have 
been concurrently announced.  
As found in prior research, management forecasts are associated with negative abnormal 
returns on average.  The average abnormal return is –3.48%, similar to that reported in prior 
research (e.g., Hutton, Miller, and Skinner [2003]).  The negative mean return is driven both by 
the higher frequency of bad news forecasts and by the larger magnitude of negative abnormal 
return, relative to good news forecasts.  Of the 27,792 management forecasts, 15,850 have 
negative abnormal returns and 11,942 have positive abnormal returns.  While the average 
                                                 
5 Using other cutoff values, such as ±1%, ±1.5%, ±2%, or ±3%, yields qualitatively similar results.  
6 We do not include firms that never had management forecasts in the period, due to the concern that First Call 
might have systematically omitted management forecasts of certain firms. Whether to include these firms is unlikely 
to affect our inferences. First, our sample includes almost 5,000 unique firms in total, a very large sample. Second, 
firms that are not included are generally small and economically insignificant in the economy.  
 13
abnormal return for good news forecasts is 7.57%, the average abnormal return for bad news 
forecasts is –11.93%.  
Panel B of Table 1 describes the distribution of management forecast frequency across firms.  
On average, each firm issues 5.6 management forecasts over the sample period (eight years), 
similar to the frequency reported in other studies (e.g., Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003]).  
This average is comprised of 2.4 good news and 3.2 bad news forecasts.  
Panel A of Figure 1 reports the distribution of management forecasts across years.  As shown 
in this figure, there is an increasing trend in the frequency of all management forecasts, good 
news forecasts, and bad news forecasts.  The jump in year 2001 coincides with the passage of 
Regulation Fair Disclosure in October 2000 (Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang [2003]). 
3.2 INSIDER TRADING DATA 
We obtain insider trading data reported in the SEC’s Official Summary of Security 
Transactions and Holdings from Thompson Financial.  We examine two types of insider trading 
transactions: open market purchases and open market sales.  Another important type of insider 
trading is option exercises.  Because managers exercise options at a previously fixed exercise 
price, option exercises per se do not alter managers’ wealth or risk exposure; such effects occur 
with the subsequent sales of the shares acquired. Thus, option exercises should have little impact 
on managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions.  Accordingly, we do not include purchases of 
shares through the exercise of options, but do count sales of these shares.  
We include insider trading transactions by officers and directors only and exclude transactions 
by non-officer insiders (such as large shareholders, members of advisory boards, retired officers, 
officers of subsidiaries, etc.), who are unlikely to influence management forecast decisions.  To 
investigate the aggregate behavior of the management team, we aggregate purchases or sales by 
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all managers of the same firm on the same trading day together.  Due to the variation in stock 
prices across firms, we use the dollar value of insider trading (instead of the number of shares) to 
facilitate cross-sectional comparisons. 
Panel C of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of 291,845 insider transactions made by 
managers of the 4,995 firms for the period 1995–2002.  There are 91,904 insider purchases.  The 
mean (median) size of insider purchases is $200,700 ($21,400).  In contrast, insider sales are 
more frequent and are larger in transaction size.  There are 199,941 insider sales and the mean 
(median) transaction size is $1,585,400 ($195,000).  These descriptive statistics also suggest a 
high skewness in insider trading data.  Thus, in the empirical analyses, we use logarithm 
transformation of insider trading (i.e., the natural logarithm of one plus insider trading in 
thousand dollars).  
Panel C also reports the distribution of the number of days between insider trading and the 
closest quarterly earnings announcement. If insider trading occurs before (after) earnings 
announcement, the variable is negative (positive). Both the mean and median are positive, 8 and 
12 respectively, consistent with the prevalent corporate policy that prohibits managers from 
trading right before quarterly earnings announcements (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon [2000]). 
Panel B of Figure 1 presents the trend in insider trading.  Both insider purchases and insider 
sales have an increasing trend during the 90’s bull market until the year 2000.  Insider trading 
has then subsided in the following years to levels seen in the mid-1990s.  
4. Empirical Analyses of Timing Insider Trades and Management Forecasts 
This section briefly summarizes our analyses of the timing decision: whether managers time 
insider trading and management forecasts strategically.  Details are provided in the Appendix.   
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We compare (1) insider trading before good news vs. before bad news forecasts and (2) 
insider trading after good news vs. after bad news forecasts.  Following prior research (e.g., 
Sivakumar and Waymire [1994], Noe [1999]), we use 30-day periods before and after a forecast.  
Overall, our results are consistent with Noe’s timing hypothesis.  Managers buy more after 
bad news forecasts than after good news forecasts, and sell more after good news forecasts than 
after bad news forecasts.  However, differences in trading before management forecasts are 
relatively small and insignificant (at the conventional 0.05 level), which confirms Noe’s 
conjecture that pre-disclosure trading attracts higher litigation risk. 
These results demonstrate that managers do strategically time their stock trades around 
management forecasts to increase trading profits.  The incremental profits from these trades can 
motivate managers to create profitable trading opportunities by issuing management forecasts 
strategically.  In the next section, we investigate whether this is the case.   
5. Insider Trading and the Frequency of Management Forecasts  
We first present results from investigating the impact of all insider trading (H1 and H3) 
followed by the incremental impact of CEO trading (H2).  To test our hypotheses, we examine 
the association between management forecast frequency (MF) and the amount of insider trading 
(Ins_trade), using variations of the following equation, specified in changes: 
 )error,controls,trade_Ins(fMF Δ=Δ . 
We adopt this change specification to control for firm characteristics that we expect to affect 
management forecast frequency, such as firm complexity, industry membership, analyst 
following, and firm size, as shown in prior research (e.g., Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003]).  
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As most of these firm characteristics are time-invariant or change very slowly over time, they are 
implicitly controlled for in this change specification. 
One variable that does change substantially over consecutive quarters is stock returns, which 
can affect both disclosure activity and insider trades.  For example, if performance is 
unexpectedly good, managers will be prompted to disclose good news and sell their shares after 
the disclosure.  Lang and Lundholm [1993] find that firm performance is correlated with 
disclosure quality (including the frequency of voluntary disclosures) and Skinner [1994] finds 
that failing to disclose poor performance in a timely manner can lead to litigation costs.  In 
addition, results in Ke, Huddart, and Petroni [2003] suggest that insiders trade based on longer 
term information and make forecasts that are often more than one quarter ahead.  Therefore, we 
control for changes in stock returns both in the contemporaneous quarter and in the following 
quarter. 
For each firm-quarter, we first define an indicator variable (D_ret) that equals 1 for positive 
market-adjusted return and zero otherwise, and then we take changes over consecutive quarters.  
Thus, ΔD_ret takes one of three values (–1, 0, +1).  This measure captures information possibly 
known to managers but not to investors at the beginning of the quarter.  If managers are 
considering making disclosures in the middle of the quarter, this measure also includes 
information investors already know.  However, this should not impose a problem as past stock 
performance should not affect managers’ decisions to disclose forward-looking information in 
their forecasts.  The above discussion suggests that the coefficient on the return variable should 
be positive (negative) for good news (bad news) frequency.   
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5.1 DATA 
For each firm with insider trading and management forecast data for the period 1995–2002, 
we include all calendar quarters from the first quarter to the last quarter for which the firm has 
insider trading data.  This approach yields 108,730 firm-quarters.  For each firm-quarter, we 
count the number of good news forecasts, the number of bad news forecasts, and the total of the 
two.  Similarly, we aggregate insider trading for each firm-quarter, separately for insider 
purchases and sales.  We also compute net purchases, i.e., purchases net of sales.  If there are no 
insider trades or management forecasts reported for a firm-quarter, they are assumed to be zero.7  
About 29% of firm-quarters have no insider trading transactions.  The frequency of zero 
management forecasts is much higher.  Of all firm-quarters, 81% have no management forecasts, 
90% have no good news forecasts, and 88% have no bad news forecasts.  
We then compute changes in management forecast frequency and insider trading for each firm 
over consecutive calendar quarters.  Since we cannot compute changes in the first quarter, the 
sample is reduced to 103,735 firm-quarters of 4,995 unique firms.  Table 2 reports the 
descriptive statistics for quarterly changes in management forecast frequency and insider trading.  
As reported in Panel A, about 75% of firm-quarters have no change in management forecast 
frequency (mostly because both consecutive quarters have no management forecasts), 12% have 
fewer management forecasts than the previous quarter, and the rest (13%) have more 
management forecasts than the last quarter.  The majority of the changes in forecast frequency is 
±1.  
The preponderance of zero-change observations is also evident in insider trading.  Based on 
results not reported for the sake of brevity, about half of the firm-quarters have no changes in 
                                                 
7 The underlying assumption is that the coverage for both insider trading and management forecast data in the 
databases is complete. As long as there is no systematic bias in the coverage, our results should not be affected. 
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insider purchases (41% for sales).  Considering only CEO trades, the corresponding percentages 
are 83% for purchases and 75% for sales.  (Because the database assigns different labels for the 
top manager, we include “Chairman of Board” (42.4%), “CEO” (12.6%), and “President” 
(45.0%) as CEOs, as done in Ke, Huddart, and Petroni [2003]). 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the dollar amounts of quarterly changes in 
insider trading.  The medians of quarterly changes in insider trading are expectedly zero.  
However, the variation is large: the standard deviation for quarterly changes in insider purchases 
is $662,000 and those for net purchases and insider sales are even larger, both at $9.6 million.  
Since we use log transformation of insider trading in the analyses, we report statistics for the log 
values in the next three rows. 
Panel B also reports quarterly changes in insider trading of the CEO only.  Untabulated results 
show the mean of purchases in a quarter (not changes thereof) is $27,000 and the mean of sales 
is $685,000 for CEOs.  Although centered on zero, the changes do have large variations: the 
standard deviation is $309,000 ($5.06,  $5.05 million) for changes in CEOs’ purchases (net 
purchases, sales).  Thus, the variation in the trading activity of CEOs alone is about half as much 
as the variation of all officers and directors combined. 
5.2 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES H1 AND H3 
In order to test for the effect of insider trading on management forecasts, we need to control 
for trading activity that occurs as a response to disclosure choices (i.e., reverse causality).  For 
example, more insider sales in a quarter that has increased good news disclosures can indicate 
one or both of the following: (i) management’s desire to sell motivates good news disclosures, as 
we hypothesize above, or (ii) when the stock price increases after the disclosure of good news, 
managers sell some of their holdings.  We address this endogeneity of disclosures and insider 
 19
trading using instrumental variables (IVs) for our insider trading variables (i.e., net purchases, 
purchases, sales).  Specifically, we employ two-stage least squares (2SLS).  In the first stage, we 
estimate the expected amount of insider trading for each firm-quarter, using information from the 
prior quarter, such as firm size, growth opportunities, and stock returns.  This procedure results 
in valid IVs since the expected amount of trading in quarter t is correlated with actual insider 
trading in quarter t, and it is not endogenously affected by disclosures in quarter t.  In the second 
stage, we regress changes in management forecasts on changes in the expected amount of trading 
(estimated from the first stage).  Note that our purpose is to establish that causality in the 
predicted direction contributes to the correlation between the magnitude of insider trading and 
the frequency of management forecast, but not to rule out reverse causality which is also possible 
and even likely. 
An added benefit of using expected insider trading is that it mitigates the confounding effect 
of stock purchases as a signaling device.  Costly stock purchases and verifiable voluntary 
disclosures are two alternative means of conveying private information in a credible manner.  In 
situations where management lacks verifiable good news, or even has verifiable bad news, 
insiders can convey their confidence in their company’s prospects by purchasing stock.  Thus, 
this signaling story can result in insider purchases being positively associated with more bad 
news and less good news disclosures, which are the same predictions as hypothesis H1(a).  In 
contrast to actual insider transactions, expected insider trading is estimated based on past public 
information and therefore should not be related to private information held by management. 
5.2.1. First Stage Regression. We use the following regression to explain insider trading 
measures in the first stage, where Δ refers to the change in the denoted variables: 8 
                                                 
8 We also estimate equation (1) in levels, and then calculate the changes in the predicted insider trading for use in 
the second stage regression.  Results are similar. 
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where: 
Ins_tradei,t = Insider trading for firm i in calendar quarter t; depending on the model 
specification, the variable can be insider purchases, insider sales, or net 
purchases; 
Sizei,t-1 = Natural logarithm of market value (in million dollars) at the end of quarter t-1;  
Growthi,t-1 = The market-to-book ratio at the end of quarter t-1, where book value is the 
most recent book value of equity available before the end of quarter t-1 and 
market value is measured at the end of quarter t-1;  
Reti,t-1 = Buy and hold raw stock return in quarter t-1;  
ROEi,t-1 = Most recent annual earnings available before the end of quarter t-1, scaled by 
beginning book value; 
Grantsi,t-1 = Number of options granted in quarter t-1, scaled by the number of outstanding 
shares, in percent; 
Ins_tradei,t-1 = Insider trading for firm i in quarter t-1; when explaining net purchase, past net 
purchase is used, and when explaining insider purchases or insider sales, both 
past insider purchases and past insider sales are used. 
 
The explanatory variables are identified based on prior research on insider trading.  
Lakonishok and Lee [2001] find that insiders in large firms sell more shares and, similarly, 
Rozeff and Zaman [1998] find that insiders in growth firms sell more shares.  Prior stock returns 
are included to control for the contrarian trading behavior of insiders: insiders tend to sell more 
shares after high stock returns (Lakonishok and Lee [2001]).  Earnings are included to control for 
any potential impact of firm performance on insider trading.  Ofek and Yermack [2000] find that 
managers tend to sell shares when granted more options, so we include options granted.  Lastly, 
we include lagged insider trading to control for unobservable factors that affect insider trading.9 
All explanatory variables are measured before the measurement of the dependent variables so 
that the explained insider trading is completely based on publicly available information and is 
not affected by subsequent management forecast activity. The insider trading variables 
                                                 
9 We also augmented equation (1) with the change in equity held by the insiders, as Cheng and Warfield [2005] 
find that managers with higher equity incentives (ownership, exercisable options, and unexercisable options) sell 
more shares, presumably to diversify idiosyncratic risk.  However, data on these equity incentives are only available 
for half of the sample.  As the results are similar with both specifications, we report results using the larger sample 
based on equation (1). 
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(purchases, sales, net purchases) are log transformed. Because net purchases can be either 
positive or negative, we use the natural logarithm of one plus the absolute value of net purchases, 
then add back the sign of net purchases.  
Due to additional data restriction, the sample size is reduced to 77,106 firm-quarters.  Panel A 
of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the independent variables (in levels, not changes).  
The firms have a mean market value of around $362 million (log values = 5.891 reported in the 
table) and a mean market-to-book ratio of 3.6. Quarterly stock returns are around 4.0% and ROE 
is about 6.1%.  Most firm-quarters show zero option grants, consistent with firms granting 
options on an infrequent basis, often only once each year (Aboody and Kasznik [2000]).  Log 
transformed insider purchases and insider sales are around 1.298 and 2.912, respectively, in the 
prior quarter and past net purchases are around –1.864.   
The estimation is performed separately for each quarter to ensure that we only use information 
available in the quarter.  Panel B of Table 3 reports the average coefficients and the 
corresponding time-series t-statistics.  As predicted, managers in large firms sell more and buy 
less.  While growth is positively correlated with future purchases, it does not explain insider 
sales. Consistent with a contrarian strategy, managers sell more and buy less after high stock 
returns. Accounting performance has marginal explanatory power for insider purchases but not 
sales.  Increases in option grants are followed by more insider purchases and sales.10  In contrast, 
past insider purchases are followed by relatively more insider sales and less insider purchases, 
suggesting that managers try to achieve an optimal level of exposure to their companies’ risk.11 
                                                 
10 When we split ΔGrantst-1 into Grantst-1 and Grantst-2 , we find that the positive coefficient on ΔGrantst-1 in the 
insider purchases equation is driven by the negative coefficient on Grantst-2, which suggests that managers buy 
fewer shares after being granted more options. 
11 Note that the negative coefficient on past insider trading is not a mechanical artifact due to Ins_tradet-1 being 
used to define both ΔIns_tradet and ΔIns_tradet-1.  The coefficient could be zero (indicating a random walk), 
positive (indicating a non-stationary series), or negative (indicating an autoregressive or mean-reverting process).  
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Overall, the explanatory power of the model ranges from 22% to 24%. Not tabulated for the 
sake of brevity, the correlation coefficient between the actual value and the predicted value is 
around 0.50 for each insider trading measure: quarterly change in net purchases, insider 
purchases, and insider sales.  All correlations are significant at the 0.0001 level. 
5.2.2. Second Stage. In the second stage, we estimate an equation relating changes in 
management forecast frequency and expected insider trades.  Because changes in management 
forecast are discrete and the majority is –1, 0, or 1, we use an ordinal variable, O_ΔMF, defined 
as follows: 
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where ΔMF is the quarterly change in management forecast frequency (good or bad news as the 
case may be).  Using this ordinal variable, we use ordered logit to estimate the following second 
stage regression to test whether increases or decreases in management forecast are associated 
with expected changes in insider trading, controlling for changes in contemporaneous and future 
stock returns: 
 1,0,)()Pr( 1211, =+Δ+Δ+Δ+=≥Δ +−−−−− JretDretDtradeInsEJMFO ttttttJt εγγα β   (2) 
This equation is estimated separately for each quarter, and we report the mean coefficients and p-
values according to Fama and MacBeth [1973], with corrections for serial correlation of two lags 
as suggested in Newey and West [1987].  Notice that because Ins_trade has been log 
transformed, ΔIns_trade essentially measures the ratio of insider trading of one quarter relative 
                                                                                                                                                                           
The highly significant coefficient (t-statistic = -79) does indicate that insider trading is mean-reverting, and that past 
insider trading is an important determinant of current trading. 
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to the amount in the prior quarter, so the metric is independent of the size of the firm and the 
absolute level of equity held by management.   
Table 4 reports the results from the ordered logit regression of equation (2).  For ease of result 
interpretation, we also report the change in odds due to a standard deviation change in the 
independent variable.12 The first three columns use expected net purchases while the three 
columns on the right separate purchases from sales.  We present the results in two panels, 
depending on whether we include management forecasts that occur on the same day as earnings 
announcements.  This is necessary because we use returns to infer the sign of news in the 
forecast and the earnings information potentially confounds this inference.  In our sample, 8,919 
forecasts (32.1%), occur on earnings announcement days. Results are similar across the two 
panels, so we focus on Panel B.13 
Consistent with our hypothesis, expected net purchases are associated negatively with net 
news frequency (coefficient = -0.0100, p = 0.0273).  When we separate good news from bad 
news, we find that expected net purchases have a significant positive association with bad news 
frequency (p = 0.0041), but not with good news frequency (p = 0.1799 (one-tailed)). 
When expected purchases and sales are separated in column (4), we find that only expected 
purchases but not sales are significantly (negatively) associated with net news frequency.  
Furthermore, columns (5) and (6) show that expected purchases are significantly (positively) 
                                                 
12 The odds of an event are the ratio of the probability that this event occurs to the probability that this event does 
not occur.  For example, the odds of increasing management forecast frequency are the ratio of the probability that a 
firm increases the management forecast frequency in consecutive quarters to the probability of the firm having 
constant or decreasing management forecast frequency.  The odds are a positive function of the probability that the 
event occurs. The change in the odds is a function of the coefficient in the logit regressions only unlike the change in 
the probability, which requires a reference point. 
13 As an alternative way to address the issue of concurrent earnings announcements, we re-estimate the second 
stage equation by redefining the sign of the news for these management forecasts depending on whether the forecast 
met/beat (good news) or missed (bad news) the latest consensus analyst forecast according to First Call.  While the 
results are essentially the same the as those reported in Table 4, we do not adopt this approach because there are 
biases in the classification scheme (Rogers and Van Buskirk [2006]). 
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associated with bad news frequency (coefficient = 0.0517, p = 0.0001) but not with good news.  
A one standard deviation increase in expected purchases increases the odds of increasing bad 
news management forecast frequency by 6.8%.  Thus, the evidence is consistent with H1 with 
respect to purchases and bad news frequency.  In contrast, expected insider sales are not 
associated with management forecast frequency.  This lack of significant results for insider sales 
is consistent with litigation risk concerns offsetting insider profit motives, as predicted in H3. 
The finding of expected purchases motivating bad news forecasts, in conjunction with the 
evidence that managers buy more after bad news than before, indicates that managers can benefit 
from strategic disclosures.  As shown in the Appendix, there is a significant increase in insider 
purchases following bad news announcements (coefficient = 0.482, t = 36.14) and a significant 
decline in purchases prior to such news (coefficient = -0.245, t = -12.39).  Purchases after bad 
news are twice as large as beforehand (e0.482 – -0.245 = 2.07) 
5.3 SINGLE STAGE ANALYSIS 
Larcker and Rusticus [2005] question the efficacy of using 2SLS over single stage methods 
that do not account for endogeneity.  The paper contends that 2SLS is not preferred if the IVs are 
weak instruments or are not truly exogenous.  We believe that neither of these concerns is 
significant for our instrument.  Expected insider trading has a high correlation with actual trading 
(around 0.5), and the use of prior period information to estimate expected trading implies that the 
instrument is not endogenous with management forecast activity in the current period.  
Nevertheless, for completeness, we briefly present the analysis from a single stage ordered logit 
analysis that does not control for endogeneity:   
 1,0,)Pr( 121, =+Δ+Δ+Δ+=≥Δ +−−−− JretDretDtradeInsJMFO tttttJt εγγα β   (3) 
We use actual insider trading, ΔIns_trade, in contrast to expected trading in equation (2).   
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Table 5 reports the regression results.  We focus on the most detailed results that separate 
purchases from sales and good news from bad news (columns 5 and 6).  First, consistent with the 
2SLS analysis, there is a significant positive association between bad news frequency and insider 
purchases (p = 0.0001).  Second, similar to the 2SLS results and consistent with high litigation 
risk inhibiting the release of good news in advance of insider sales, we find no significant 
association between good news frequency and insider sales, as predicted by H3 (p = 0.0623). 
Third, in contrast to the 2SLS analysis, the single stage analysis shows significant negative 
associations between purchases and good news frequency (p = 0.0178), and between sales and 
bad news frequency (p = 0.0001).  These results are consistent with insider trading affecting 
management forecast activity according to H1.  However, because there is no control for 
endogeneity, these results are also consistent with disclosures of good (bad) news leading to 
insider purchases (sales).  To help resolve whether 2SLS or single stage analysis provides more 
reliable inferences with respect to these two differing results (purchases and good news, sales 
and bad news), we examine the trading of CEOs relative to other insiders. 
5.4 THE INCREMENTAL IMPACT OF CEO INSIDER TRADING—TESTS OF H2 
In this section, we exploit the inherent difference between CEOs and other insiders.  There is 
compelling reason to believe that the CEO of a firm has the most influence over a wide range of 
decisions, including financial disclosures.14  If insider trading motives are at all related to 
management forecasting activity, this relationship should be stronger for the CEO than for other 
insiders. 
                                                 
14 We also considered the possibility that the CFO has an important role in the disclosure choice.  We repeated the 
tests of H2 combining the trades of both the CEO and the CFO.  The results are almost identical to those found for 
the CEO alone. 
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This stronger relation can manifest in two ways.  First, the CEO’s own trading will have a 
stronger influence on the firm’s forecast decisions.  Second, having better foreknowledge of 
forecasting decisions, the CEO’s forecast-motivated trading will be more intense.  While the 
underlying idea appears to be similar, these two relations have very different interpretations and 
implications.  The first relation is the direction of causality that we hypothesize in this study:  
trading influences disclosure.  In a regression of disclosure on insider trading, the coefficient on 
CEO trading should be larger than that on other insiders’ trading.  In contrast, the causality in the 
second relation is in the reverse direction: disclosure affects trading.  In regressions of insider 
trading on disclosure frequency, the coefficient on disclosure should be larger when the 
dependent variable is CEO trading compared with when the dependent variable is trading by 
other insiders.  However, we estimate the reversal of these regressions (disclosure frequency on 
insider trading), so the coefficient on CEO trading should be smaller than that on trading by 
other insiders.15 
We test H2 by adding CEO trading to equation (3): 
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Since ΔIns_trade already includes trading by all insiders (including the CEO), the coefficient on 
ΔCEO_trade captures the incremental impact of the CEO’s trading on forecast frequency.  A 
significant incremental coefficient on CEO trading in the same direction as the predicted 
coefficient on total insider trading implies a stronger effect of CEO trading on disclosure, 
supporting the hypothesized relation.  In contrast, a significant incremental coefficient in the 
                                                 
15 This is a basic econometric result: a higher coefficient in the forward regression implies a lower coefficient in 
the reverse regression.   
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opposite direction implies a stronger effect of disclosure on CEO trading, supporting causality 
that is reverse of that hypothesized.  
Table 6 reports the regression results.  The coefficients on total insider trading are presented at 
the top and they are similar to the results in Table 5.  The incremental coefficients in the second 
half of the table show that changes in CEOs’ net purchases have a significant negative effect on 
net news frequency (coefficient = –0.0061, p = 0.0153), due to a significant increment increase 
in bad news (coefficient = 0.0092, p = 0.0037), while the decrease in good news is insignificant 
(p = 0.3280).  Looking at CEO purchases and sales separately, we observe that it is CEO 
purchases, not CEO sales, that drive the significant incremental increase in bad news frequency 
(coefficient = 0.0162, p = 0.0212).  This last result is consistent with H2 and the sign of this 
significant incremental coefficient is the same as the sign of the base coefficient, confirming our 
hypothesized direction of causality.  
5.5 SUMMARY OF ANALYSES AND COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
For ease of comparison, Table 7 reproduces selected results from Tables 4, 5, and 6, along 
with the litigation risk assessment previously described.  To recap, the results in Tables 4 suggest 
that expected insider purchases increase the frequency of bad news forecasts and Table 6 shows 
that bad news frequency is more strongly associated with actual CEO purchases than purchases 
by other insiders.  The lack of significance in the incremental coefficients in the other three 
action combinations (CEO purchases/good news, CEO sales/good news, CEO sales/bad news in 
Table 6) is the same as the pattern found in Table 4 using 2SLS, and contrasts with the pattern 
found in Table 5 when we do not control for endogeneity.  This difference leads us to believe 
that Table 5’s results are partially influenced by endogeneity and therefore less reliable than 
those in Tables 4 and 6.  The combination of results leads us to conclude that (i) insider 
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purchases do motivate the release of more bad news, (ii) the desire to purchase at a lower price 
does not significantly inhibit the release of good news, and (iii) insider selling neither motivates 
more good news announcements nor inhibits bad news announcements.   
6. Conclusion 
We examine whether corporate insiders behave strategically with respect to both their stock 
trading activity and their disclosure decisions.  Confirming and extending prior studies, the 
evidence is consistent with managers strategically choosing the timing of their purchase and sale 
orders around voluntary disclosure to increase their trading profits.  This incremental trading 
profit can motivate managers to create such profit opportunities by changing their voluntary 
disclosure practices.  
Using management forecast frequency to proxy for voluntary disclosure policy, we find strong 
and robust results consistent with insider purchases influencing disclosure activity.  Increases in 
(expected) stock purchases are associated with more bad new forecasts, which help to reduce the 
purchase price.  This result, combined with the evidence that managers buy more after bad news 
than beforehand, suggests that managers are able to increase trading profits, and they do so 
without substantial litigation risk. Investor losses from selling too early at depressed prices are 
generally considered opportunity costs and not damages in litigation (Niehaus and Roth [1999], 
Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo [2005]).  This result is similar in nature to the strategic timing of 
disclosures around (fixed date) option grants found in Aboody and Kasznik [2000] and 
Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam [2004].  
In contrast, when trading or disclosure actions are likely to increase litigation risk 
substantially, we find no significant relations between insider trading and disclosure.  This is 
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reassuring.  Had we found robust evidence that managers forecast more good news when they 
are selling more, that would have suggested a fairly widespread use of what is commonly 
characterized as “pump and dump” activity: inflating the stock price ahead of insider sales.  
Likewise, a robust evidence that managers withhold bad news forecasts when they sell or 
withold good news when they buy would have suggested that many managers are frequently 
violating the “disclose or abstain” rule.  These strategies have a high risk of civil litigation or 
criminal penalties. 
Our results are not attributable to the alternative explanation that managers’ trading activity is 
a way to signal their private information, such as buying shares to signal their optimistic beliefs 
in the company’s prospects after disclosing bad news.  Our approach, using predicted insider 
trading instead of actual trading, rules out this alternative explanation, since the predicted trading 
is computed from past public information and therefore cannot contain private information 
known only to management.  More generally, this approach controls for the endogeneity between 
trading and disclosure.  Thus, the association we find between trading and disclosure is not a 
result of trading responding to disclosures. 
This paper contributes to our understanding of the determinants of voluntary disclosures of 
timely information. It also adds to the debate on the relation between equity incentives and 
management forecasts examined in Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003] and discussed in Barth 
[2003].  In particular, while high equity incentives can align managers’ disclosure preferences 
with investors’, those equity incentives, via their impact on insider trading, can also result in 
strategic disclosures if such disclosures increase managers’ private benefits.  Depending on one’s 
point of view, this strategic behavior could be considered opportunistic and self-serving on the 
part of management.  Equally, one could argue that investors benefit from the timely revelation 
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of information when management uses the latitude they have over trading and disclosure 
decisions.  
 31
APPENDIX 
Timing Analyses: Hypotheses and Results 
This Appendix contains our hypothesis and tests of managers’ timing decisions: whether 
managers time insider trades and management forecasts strategically, following Noe [1999].  The 
timing hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: 
Managers choose to time their trades so that:  
(a) Purchases before disclosing good news are higher than those before disclosing bad 
news; 
(b) Purchases after disclosing bad news are higher than those after disclosing good 
news; 
(c) Sales before disclosing good news are lower than those before disclosing bad news; 
(d) Sales after disclosing bad news are lower than those after disclosing good news. 
 
Letting A, B, C, and D denote the amount of insider trading, the following summarizes these 
predictions: 
 Before news After news 
Good news A B 
Bad news C D 
 
Predictions    
For insider purchases: (a): A > C (b): B < D 
For insider sales: (c): A < C (d): B > D 
 
As reported in Table 1, management forecasts are generally issued within the month before 
earnings announcements and prior research finds that managers also trade around earnings 
announcements in a systematic manner (Sivakumar and Waymire [1994]).  In particular, insider 
trading intensity is relatively lower before earnings announcements and higher afterwards.  Thus, 
we control for the impact of earnings announcements in the following regression to examine the 
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timing pattern of insider trading and management forecasts (firm-day subscripts have been 
suppressed):16 
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The dependent variable, Ins_trade, is insider purchases or insider sales, measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the transaction value (in thousand dollars) for a firm-day.  We 
estimate the above regression using all insider transactions described in Table 1.  According to 
the timing hypothesis, the trading behavior around management forecasts is different for insider 
purchases and insider sales.  Thus, we analyze them separately. Since there are occasions when 
some managers of a firm buy shares and other managers of the same firm sell shares on the same 
day, we calculate the net trading (purchases minus sales) for each firm-day.  If the net trading is 
positive, it is classified as a purchase, and if the net trading is negative, it is classified as a sale.  
Due to these coincident transactions, the sample size is 286,454, slightly smaller than that in 
Panel C of Table 1 (291,845 transactions). 
Independent variables include four timing indicator variables for management forecasts and 
four indicator variables for earnings announcements.17   
 Pre_MF_G (Post_MF_G) is one if the insider transaction date falls within the 30-day 
window before (after) a good news forecast.   
 Pre_MF_B (Post_MF_B) is one if the insider transaction date falls within the 30-day 
window before (after) a bad news forecast. 
 Pre_EA_G (Post_EA_G) is one if the insider transaction date falls within the 30-day 
window before (after) a good news earnings announcement. 
 Pre_EA_B (Post_EA_B) is one if the insider transaction date falls within the 30-day 
window before (after) a bad news earnings announcement. 
 
                                                 
16 Outliers, defined as observations with studentized residuals greater than three in absolute value, are excluded. 
None of the regressions are subject to multicollinearity based on the diagnostics in Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
[1980]. 
17 We classify the news of earnings announcements in the same way as for management forecasts. 
 33
The coefficients on these eight indicator variables capture the “abnormal” insider trading around 
disclosure events (forecasts or earnings announcements) relative to days not around such 
disclosure events.  As a reminder, the timing hypothesis predicts that for insider purchases, β1 > 
β3 and β2 < β4, and that for insider sales, β1 < β3 and β2 > β4.  
Panel A of the Appendix Table reports regression results, while Panel B reports the difference 
in the coefficients on insider trading between good news and bad news, as well as the 
corresponding p-value of Wald tests of the predictions. 
Insider purchases after good news are significantly lower than after bad news forecasts (p = 
0.0001).  Also consistent with the hypothesis, insider sales after good news are significantly 
higher than after bad news at the 0.0001 level.  The magnitude of these differences is also 
economically significant:  insider purchases after good news are only about half of those after 
bad news (e–0.647 = 0.52) and insider sales after good news are e1.095 = 2.99 times those after bad 
news. 
The results for insider trades that occur prior to management forecasts are insignificant.  
Similar amounts of trading are observed before good and bad news announcements.  These 
results are consistent with Noe’s conjecture that higher litigation risk imposed by the “disclose or 
abstain” rule inhibits trading prior to voluntary disclosures. 
Panel A also reports results for earnings announcement control variables, which are similar to 
those reported in prior research (e.g., Sivakumar and Waymire [1994], Noe [1999]).  There are 
fewer purchases after good news than after bad news earnings announcements (coefficients –
0.244 vs. 0.051).  Insider sale are more prevalent after good news than after bad news earnings 
announcements (coefficients 0.775 vs. 0.081).  These patterns are consistent with managers 
strategically timing transactions around earnings announcements. 
 34
Overall, these results indicate that managers strategically time trading around management 
forecasts.  They are robust to alternative research designs, including the matched pairs design 
used in Noe [1999] and a design of regressing monthly aggregated insider trading measures on 
aggregated timing variable measures using firm-month observations. We also control for other 
determinants of insider trading suggested by prior research (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee [2001], 
Rozeff and Zaman [1998]), such as firm size, growth, stock returns, and accounting performance. 
The results are quantitatively similar.  
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APPENDIX TABLE 
Insider Trading Around Management Forecasts 
 
This table reports the results from estimating the following regression: 
 
ε
γγγγ
ββββα
++
++++
++++=
−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−
effectsfixedearlyY
BEAPostBEAPreGEAPostGEAPre
BMFPostBMFPreGMFPostGMFPretradeIns
4321
4321
 (A1) 
Ins_trade is insider purchases or insider sales, measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
transaction value (in thousand dollars), for a firm-day.  Since there are occasions when some managers of 
a firm buy shares and other managers of the same firm sell shares on the same day, we calculate the net 
trading (purchases minus sales) for each firm-day.  If the net trading is positive, it is classified as a 
purchase, and if the net trading is negative, it is classified as a sale.  Insider purchases are set at zero for 
firm-days with insider sales, and vice versa.  Due to this further aggregation, the sample used in this 
regression, 286,454 firm-days of 4,995 firms for the period 1995-2002, is slightly different from that in 
Table 1, Panel C.  Pre_MF_G (Post_MF_G) is one if the insider transaction date falls within the 30-day 
window before (after) a good news forecast.  Pre_MF_B (Post_MF_B) is one if the insider transaction 
date falls within the 30-day window before (after) a bad news forecast.  The timing variables for earnings 
announcements (Pre_EA_G, Post_EA_G, Post_EA_B, Post_EA_B) are defined similarly.  We control for 
year fixed effects by including indicator variables for the years in which the insider transactions occur; 
these coefficients are not reported for brevity. 
 
Panel A: Regression results for insider purchases and insider sales 
    Insider purchases  Insider sales 
    coef. t  coef. t 
       
Pre_MF_G  –0.202 –10.97  0.671 20.37 
Post_MF_G  –0.165 –12.39  0.847 35.34 
Pre_MF_B  –0.245 –14.88  0.594 20.14 
Post_MF_B  0.482 36.14  –0.248 –10.35 
Pre_EA_G  0.245 19.80  –0.615 –27.75 
Post_EA_G  –0.244 –32.23  0.775 57.09 
Pre_EA_B  0.175 13.71  –0.591 –25.81 
Post_EA_B  0.051 6.31  0.081 5.63 
       
Year indicators Yes   Yes  
Adj. R2 0.037   0.042  
 
 36
APPENDIX TABLE – CONTINUED 
Panel B: Summary of the coefficients on management forecast timing variables and tests of the 
timing hypothesis 
  Insider purchases  Insider sales 
  Before news After news  Before news After news 
Good news (1)  –0.202 –0.165  0.671 0.847 
(t-statistic)  (–10.97) (–12.39)  (20.37) (35.34) 
       
Bad news (2)  –0.245 0.482  0.594 –0.248 
(t-statistic)  (–12.39) (36.14)  (35.34) (–10.35) 
       
Tests of the timing hypothesis:      
Predicted sign  + −  − + 
(1) – (2)  0.043 –0.647  –0.077 1.095 
(p-value)  ( 0.0775) (0.0001)  (0.0747) (0.0001) 
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TABLE 1 
 Summary Statistics for Management Forecasts and Insider Trading 
 
Panel A: Timing and abnormal returns around management forecasts 
These statistics are based on 27,792 individual management forecasts issued by 4,995 firms for the period 
1995-2002. The abnormal return is calculated as the sum of size-adjusted daily returns in the three-day 
window [–1, 1] around management forecasts.  If the abnormal return around a management forecast is 
positive, we classify it as good news, and if the abnormal return is negative, we classify it as a bad news.  
Based on this classification, 11,942 are good news forecasts and 15,850 are bad news forecasts. 
 Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
Number of days to the next quarterly earnings 
announcement * 23 25.8 0 15 37 
Number of days to the closest quarterly earnings 
announcement*, ** –7 22.3 –22 0 0 
Number of days to the fiscal period end corresponding 
to the forecast (i.e., forecast horizon) 127 162 2 68 248 
Abnormal return (%)      
All management forecasts –3.48 15.14 –8.85 –1.20 3.81 
Good news forecasts 7.57 9.33 2.04 4.86 9.75 
Bad news forecasts –11.93 13.15 –16.43 –7.23 –2.79 
 
Panel B: Distribution of management forecast frequency across firms 
These statistics are based on 27,792 individual management forecasts, 11,942 good news forecasts and 
15,850 bad news forecasts, issued by 4,995 firms in the period 1995–2002.  
 Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
 
All management forecasts 5.6 5.81 2 3 7 
 
Good news forecasts 2.4 3.19 0 1 3 
 
Bad news forecasts 3.2 3.19 1 2 4 
 
Panel C: Summary statistics for insider trading measures used in timing analyses 
These statistics are based on 291,845 insider trading transactions made by managers of 4,995 firms in the 
period 1995–2002.  We aggregate purchases or sales by all managers of the same firm on the same 
trading day.  
 N Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
Insider purchases ($000) 91,904 200.7 2,913.5 6.8 21.4 71.5 
Insider sales ($000) 199,941 1,585.4 3,189.7 53.6 195.0 697.7 
Number of days to the closest quarterly 
earnings announcement *** 291,845 8 25.4 –4 12 27 
 *  Zero for management forecasts occurring on the same day as earnings announcements.   
 ** This variable is positive (negative) if the management forecast follows (precedes) the closest 
earnings announcement date. 
 *** This variable is positive (negative) if the transaction occurs after (precedes) the closest earnings 
announcement date.  
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TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics of Changes in Management Forecast Frequency and Insider Trading 
 
These statistics are based on 103,735 firm-quarters in the period 1995–2002.  We count the number of 
good news forecasts and the number of bad news forecasts for each firm-quarter.  Good (bad) news 
forecasts are those with positive (negative) size-adjusted returns in the three-day window around the 
disclosure date.  Net news forecasts frequency is the difference between good news and bad news forecast 
frequency.  We aggregate insider purchases and insider sales by all managers (including CEOs) separately 
for each firm-quarter.  Similar procedures are taken to calculate CEOs’ insider trading.  Net purchases are 
the difference between insider purchases and insider sales. 
 
Panel A: Quarterly change in management forecast frequency 
Change in 
frequency 
All 
forecasts 
Good news 
forecasts
Bad news 
forecasts 
Net news 
forecasts
4 19 6 2 88
3 136 38 62 364
2 1,557 585 811 2,091
1 12,035 6,812 9,193 11,179
0 77,604 89,572 84,389 76,139
–1 11,065 6,217 8,543 11,400
–2 1,205 475 684 2,019
–3 105 29 51 373
–4 9 1 0 82
Total 103,735 103,735 103,735 103,735
 
Panel B: Quarterly changes in insider trading measures 
 Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
For all managers       
Changes in insider trading      
Net purchases ($000) –23.73 9,610 –158 0 137 
Insider purchases ($000) –6.50 662 –0.55 0 0 
Insider sales ($000) 17.23 9,597 –45.62 0 49.83 
Changes in insider trading in log transform      
Log(net purchases) * –0.034 4.93 –2.52 0 2.32 
Log(1+insider purchases, $000) –0.040 2.65 –0.06 0 0 
Log(1+insider sales, $000) 0.007 3.65 –0.69 0 0.76 
 
For CEOs       
Changes in insider trading      
Net purchases ($000) –10.30 5,061 0 0 0 
Insider purchases ($000) –1.28 309 0 0 0 
Insider sales ($000) 9.02 5,053 0 0 0 
Changes in insider trading in log transform      
Log(net purchases) * –0.007 3.48 0 0 0 
Log(1+insider purchases, $000) –0.006 1.69 0 0 0 
Log(1+insider sales, $000) 0.001 2.99 0 0 0 
* Log transformation of net purchases takes the sign of net purchases and its magnitude is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the absolute value of net purchases in thousands. 
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TABLE 3 
Estimating Expected Insider Trades 
 
This table reports analyses of explaining insider trading using past information, based on 77,106 firm-
quarters in the period 1995–2002.  The regression equation is as follows: 
 
t,i1t,i61t,i51t,i4
1t,i31t,i21t,i10t,i
tradeInsGrantsROE
RetGrowthSizetradeIns
ξδδδ
δδδδ
+Δ+Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ
−−−−
−−−− ,  (1) 
where: 
Ins_tradei,t = Insider trading for firm i in calendar quarter t; depending on the model specification, the 
variable can be insider purchases, insider sales, or net purchases (insider purchases minus 
sales); 
Sizei,t-1 = Natural logarithm of market value (in million dollars) at the end of quarter t-1;  
Growthi,t-1 = The market-to-book ratio at the end of quarter t-1, where book value is the most recent 
book value available before the end of quarter t-1 and market value is measured at the end 
of quarter t-1;  
Reti,t-1 = Buy and hold raw stock return in quarter t-1;  
ROEi,t-1 = Most recent annual earnings available before the end of quarter t-1, scaled by beginning 
book value; 
Grantsi,t-1 = Number of options granted in quarter t-1, scaled by the number of outstanding shares, in 
percent; 
Ins_tradei,t-1 = Insider trading for firm i in quarter t-1; when explaining one-quarter-ahead net purchase, 
net purchase is used, and when explaining one-quarter-ahead insider purchases or insider 
sales, both insider purchases and insider sales are used. 
To control for the impact of extreme values, we take natural logarithm of insider trading measures (before 
we calculate quarterly changes).  The log transformation of net purchases has the sign of net purchases 
and takes the value of the natural logarithm of one plus the absolute value of net purchases. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables (in levels) 
    Mean  Std. Q1 Median Q3 
Size  5.891 1.962 4.427 5.781 7.160 
Growth  3.581 4.598 1.337 2.219 3.913 
Ret  0.040 0.326 –0.143 0.015 0.176 
ROE  0.061 0.455 0.006 0.123 0.207 
Option grants  0.200 0.695 0.000 0.000 0.019 
Past net purchases  –1.864 4.578 –6.100 0.000 0.000 
Past insider purchase  1.298 2.125 0.000 0.000 2.658 
Past insider sales  2.912 3.537 0.000 0.000 6.207 
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TABLE 3 – CONTINUED 
Panel B: Regression results 
Equation (1) is estimated for each quarter in the sample period.  This table reports the average 
coefficients, the time-series t-statistics, and average adjusted R2 (Fama and MacBeth 1973). 
Dependent variable: Net  purchases 
Insider  
purchases 
Insider  
sales 
ΔSize –1.676 –0.254 1.273 
 (–10.08) (–3.01) (8.77) 
ΔGrowth 0.001 0.021 0.014 
 (0.07) (2.95) (1.03) 
ΔRet –0.548 –0.270 0.311 
 (–4.85) (–4.31) (3.49) 
ΔROE 0.150 0.131 –0.013 
 (1.04) (1.71) (–0.13) 
ΔOption grants –0.007 0.002 0.031 
 (–0.34) (1.96) (1.69) 
ΔPast net purchases –0.455   
 (–78.99)   
ΔPast insider purchases  –0.469 –0.013 
  (–76.62) (–3.92) 
ΔPast insider sales  –0.006 –0.462 
  (–2.18) (–78.58) 
    
Mean adjusted R2 0.222 0.240 0.223 
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TABLE 4 
Expected Insider Trading and Management Forecast Frequency  
 
This table reports the results from estimating the following ordered logit equation: 
 1,0,)()Pr( 1211, =+Δ+Δ+Δ+=≥Δ +−−−−− JretDretDtradeInsEJMFO ttttttJt εγγα β   (2) 
The dependent variable is an ordinal variable based on quarterly changes in management forecast 
frequency (∆MF): 
 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
−≤Δ
=Δ
≥Δ
−
=Δ−
1MFif
0MFif
1MFif
1
0
1
MFO . 
This variable is defined based on good news frequency, bad news frequency, and net news frequency, 
which is the difference between the first two.  In the first three columns, Et-1(ΔIns_tradet) is the expected 
quarterly changes in net purchases, which are then separated into purchases and sales for the latter three 
columns.  Expected values are the fitted values from the regressions reported in Table 3.  For each firm-
quarter, we define an indicator variable (D_ret) which equals one if a firm’s abnormal return is positive, 
and then take changes over consecutive quarters.  The regressions are estimated using 77,106 firm-
quarters in the period 1995-2002, separately for each quarter.  The table reports the mean coefficients 
from 30 quarterly regressions, preceded by the predicted sign, and followed by the change in odds due to 
a one standard deviation change in the independent variable [in brackets] and the one-tailed Fama-
MacBeth p-values (in parentheses) with a Newey-West correction for serial correlation of two lags.  
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TABLE 4 – CONTINUED 
Panel A: Including all available management forecasts (i.e., including those concurrent with 
earnings announcements) 
 
Net news 
frequency 
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
Net news 
frequency 
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 – – +    
–0.0125 –0.0094 0.0173    
[–0.026] [–0.019] [0.041]    
Predicted net purchases 
(β0) 
(0.0143) (0.0746) (0.0002)    
       
    – – + 
   –0.0365 –0.0110 0.0484 
   [–0.044] [–0.012] [0.064] 
Predicted insider 
purchases (β1) 
   (0.0001) (0.1089) (0.0001) 
       
    + + – 
   0.0013 0.0077 –0.0045 
   [0.010] [0.016] [–0.007] 
Predicted insider sales 
(β2) 
   (0.2635) (0.2447) (0.2509) 
       
 + + – + + – 
0.4236 0.2942 –0.4673 0.4224 0.2947 –0.4752 
[0.337] [0.225] [–0.271] [0.336] [0.225] [–0.270] 
Change in stock return 
indicators (γ1) 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
 + + – + + – 
–0.0364 –0.0115 0.0503 –0.0369 –0.0014 0.0509 
[–0.023] [–0.004] [0.036] [–0.023] [–0.004] [0.037] 
Future change in stock 
return indicators (γ2) 
(0.9783) (0.5237) (0.9866) (0.9783) (0.5277) (0.9875) 
       
Mean pseudo R2 0.0252 0.0108 0.0270 0.0264 0.0117 0.0282 
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TABLE 4 – CONTINUED 
Panel B: Excluding management forecasts concurrent with earnings announcements 
 
Net news 
frequency 
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
Net news 
frequency 
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 – – +    
–0.0100 –0.0067 0.0123    
[–0.021] [–0.014] [0.030]    
Predicted net purchases 
(β0) 
(0.0273) (0.1799) (0.0041)    
       
    – – + 
   –0.0357 –0.0093 0.0517 
   [–0.043] [–0.009] [0.068] 
Predicted insider 
purchases (β1) 
   (0.0001) (0.1141) (0.0001) 
       
    + + – 
   0.0020 0.0055 –0.0030 
   [0.005] [0.013] [–0.005] 
Predicted insider sales 
(β2) 
   (0.3794) (0.3244) (0.2898) 
       
 + + – + + – 
0.4067 0.2663 –0.4539 0.4053 0.2670 –0.4519 
[0.323] [0.203] [–0.264] [0.322] [0.203] [–0.263] 
Change in stock return 
indicators (γ1) 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
 + + – + + – 
–0.0348 0.0021 0.0474 –0.0350 0.0022 0.0476 
[–0.022] [0.004] [0.034] [–0.022] [0.004] [0.034] 
Future change in stock 
return indicators (γ2) 
(0.9727) (0.4526) (0.9754) (0.9738) (0.4487) (0.9759) 
       
Mean pseudo R2 0.0219 0.0080 0.0234 0.0230 0.0091 0.0249 
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TABLE 5 
Ordered Logit Regression of Quarterly Changes in Management Forecast Frequency on Quarterly 
Changes in Insider Trading without Accounting for Endogeneity   
 
This table reports the results from estimating the following ordered logit equation: 
 1,0,)Pr( 121, =+Δ+Δ+Δ+=≥Δ +−−−− JretDretDtradeInsJMFO tttttJt εγγα β   (3) 
The dependent variable (O_ΔMF) is an ordinal variable based on quarterly changes in management 
forecast as defined in Table 4.  This variable is calculated separately using good news frequency, bad 
news frequency, and net news frequency, which is the difference between the first two.  In the first three 
columns, ΔIns_tradet is the quarterly change in net purchases, which are then separated into purchases 
and sales.  To control for the impact of extreme values, we log transform the insider trading measures 
(before we calculate quarterly changes), as described in Table 2.  The regressions are estimated using 
103,735 firm-quarters in the period 1995-2002, separately for each quarter.  The table reports the mean 
coefficients from 31 quarterly regressions, preceded by the predicted signs, and followed by the change in 
odds due to a one standard deviation change in the independent variable [in brackets] and the one-tailed 
Fama-MacBeth p-values (in parentheses) with a Newey-West correction for serial correlation of two lags. 
 
Net news 
frequency  
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
Net news 
frequency 
Good news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 – – +    
–0.0161 –0.0068 0.0214    
[–0.075] [–0.030] [0.112]    
Net purchases (β0) 
(0.0001) (0.0267) (0.0001)    
       
    – – + 
   –0.0252 –0.0092 0.0326 
   [–0.063] [–0.022] [0.093] 
Insider purchases (β1) 
   (0.0001) (0.0178) (0.0001) 
       
    + + – 
   0.0141 0.0065 –0.0196 
   [0.055] [0.027] [–0.068] 
Insider sales (β2) 
   (0.0001) (0.0623) (0.0001) 
       
 + + – + + – 
0.4005 0.2651 –0.4564 0.4002 0.2652 –0.4558 
[0.316] [0.201] [–0.267] [0.316] [0.202] [–0.266] 
Change in stock 
return indicators (γ1) 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
       
 + + – + + – 
–0.0348 –0.0132 0.0343 –0.0350 –0.0138 0.0343 
[–0.021] [–0.007] [0.035] [–0.022] [–0.007] [0.034] 
Future change in 
stock return indicators 
(γ2) (0.9704) (0.7764) (0.9704) (0.9685) (0.7850) (0.9678) 
       
Mean pseudo R2 0.0244 0.0097 0.0278 0.0257 0.0104 0.0290 
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 TABLE 6 
Ordered Logit Regression of Changes in Management Forecast Frequency on Changes in Total Insider 
Trading and CEO Trading   
This table presents the results from estimating the following equation: 
1,0J,retDretD
tradeCEOtradeIns)JMFOPr(
t1t2t1
ttt,Jt
=+Δ+Δ+
Δ⋅+Δ⋅+=≥
+−−
−−−
εγγ
α δβ
  (4) 
The dependent variable (O_ΔMF) is an ordinal variable based on quarterly changes in management 
forecast as defined in Table 4.  This variable is calculated separately using good news frequency, bad 
news frequency, and net news frequency, which is the difference between the first two.  In the first three 
columns, ΔIns_tradet is the quarterly change in net purchases, which are then separated into purchases 
and sales.  ΔIns_tradet includes trading by all insiders (including CEOs), while ΔCEO_tradet only 
includes trading by CEOs.  To control for the impact of extreme values, we log transform the insider 
trading measures (before we calculate quarterly changes), as described in Table 2.  The regressions are 
estimated using 103,735 firm-quarters in the period 1995-2002, separately for each quarter.  The table 
reports the mean coefficients from 31 quarterly regressions, preceded by the predicted signs, and followed 
by the change in odds due to a one standard deviation change in the independent variable [in brackets] 
and the one-tailed Fama-MacBeth p-values (in parentheses) with a Newey-West correction for serial 
correlation of two lags. 
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TABLE 6 – CONTINUED 
 
 
Net news 
frequency 
Good 
news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
Net news 
frequency 
Good 
news 
frequency 
Bad news 
frequency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total insider transactions – – +    
–0.0153 –0.0063 0.0200    
[–0.070] [–0.028] [0.105]    
Net purchases (β0) 
(0.0001) (0.0426) (0.0001)    
    – – + 
   –0.0247 –0.0134 0.0282 
   [–0.061] [–0.032] [0.081] 
Insider purchases (β1) 
   (0.0001) (0.0058) (0.0001) 
    + + – 
   0.0131 0.0051 –0.0189 
   [0.052] [0.021] [–0.066] 
Insider sales (β2) 
   (0.0005) (0.1052) (0.0001) 
CEO transactions – – +    
–0.0061 –0.0011 0.0092    
[–0.006] [–0.003] [0.015]    
Net purchases (δ0) 
(0.0153) (0.3280) (0.0037)    
    – – + 
   –0.0038 0.0097 0.0162 
   [–0.002] [0.019] [0.030] 
CEO purchases (δ1) 
   (0.2932) (0.8821) (0.0212) 
    + + – 
   0.0060 0.0011 –0.0014 
   [0.008] [0.008] [–0.001] 
CEO sales (δ2) 
   (0.0335) (0.2179) (0.3983) 
 + + – + + – 
0.4006 0.2647 –0.4568 0.4003 0.2647 –0.4562 
[0.316] [0.201] [–0.267] [0.316] [0.201] [–0.266] 
Change in stock return 
indicators (γ1) 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
 + + – + + – 
–0.0242 –0.0049 0.0340 –0.0239 –0.0054 0.0333 
[–0.021] [–0.007] [0.024] [–0.021] [–0.002] [0.024] 
Future change in stock 
return indicators (γ2) 
(0.9411) (0.6207) (0.9672) (0.9354) (0.6319) (0.9629) 
Mean pseudo R2 0.0250 0.0101 0.0284 0.0265 0.0113 0.0301 
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TABLE 7 
Litigation Risk Assessment and Selected Results from Tables 4, 5, and 6 
 
Combined litigation risk   
 Good news frequency Bad news frequency 
Insider purchases 
withhold good news 
(moderate) 
release bad news 
(low) 
Insider sales 
release good news 
(moderate) 
withhold bad news 
(high) 
   
Table 4 – Panel A   
 Dependent variable = Good news frequency 
Dependent variable = 
Bad news frequency 
Predicted insider purchases  
coefficient (p-value) 
–0.0110 
(0.1089) 
0.0484 
(0.0001) 
Predicted insider sales 
coefficient (p-value) 
0.0077 
(0.2447) 
–0.0045 
(0.2509) 
   
Table 4 – Panel B   
 Dependent variable = Good news frequency 
Dependent variable = 
Bad news frequency 
Predicted insider purchases  
coefficient (p-value) 
–0.0093 
(0.1141) 
0.0517 
(0.0001) 
Predicted insider sales 
coefficient (p-value) 
0.0055 
(0.3244) 
–0.0030 
(0.2898) 
   
Table 5   
 Dependent variable = Good news frequency 
Dependent variable = 
Bad news frequency 
Insider purchases coefficient 
(p-value) 
–0.0092 
(0.0178) 
0.0326 
(0.0001) 
Insider sales coefficient 
(p-value) 
0.0065 
(0.0623) 
–0.0196 
(0.0001) 
   
Table 6   
 Dependent variable = Good news frequency 
Dependent variable = 
Bad news frequency 
CEO purchases coefficient 
(p-value) 
0.0097 
(0.8821) 
0.0162 
(0.0212) 
CEO sales coefficient 
(p-value) 
0.0011 
(0.2179) 
–0.0014 
(0.3983) 
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FIGURE 1 
The trend of management forecast frequency and insider trading magnitude over time 
This figure presents the time trend of management forecast frequency in Panel A and the time trend of 
insider trading magnitude in Panel B.  Panel A is based on 27,792 individual management forecasts 
issued by 4,995 firms in the period 1995-2002.  Management forecasts with positive abnormal returns in 
the three-day window around the disclosure are classified as good news forecasts and those with negative 
abnormal returns are bad news forecasts. Panel B is based on 291,845 insider trading transactions made 
by managers of the same 4,995 firms in the period 1995-2002.  
 
Panel A: Trend of management forecast frequency over time 
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Panel B: Trend of insider purchases and insider sales over time 
0
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
In
si
de
r s
al
es
 ($
m
ill
io
n)
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
In
si
de
r p
ur
ch
as
es
 ($
m
ill
io
n)
Insider sales
Insider
purchases
 
 
